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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-1738 
____________ 
 
 
JOSEPH CONSONERY, JR. 
                                                      
v. 
 
WARDEN JOSEPH W.PELZER; SENIOR CAPTAIN EDWARD STRAWN;  
CAPTAIN MICHAEL KING;  
OFFICER CHRIS CAIN; OFFICER JOHN STAPELTON:  
DISTRICT ATTORNEY STEVEN M. TOPRANI; JOHN TEAMUS,  
DEPUTY WARDEN; NURSE  ESTHER; WASHINGTON COUNTY, 
 
Appellants  
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-09-cv-01510) 
District Judge:  Hon. Maureen P. Kelly 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2013 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 7, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
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 Seven defendants appeal from the District Court’s partial denial of their motion for 
summary judgment.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s 
decision in part and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties, and therefore confine our 
discussion to the facts that are necessary to our disposition.  On February 6, 2009, 
plaintiff Joseph Consonery was incarcerated at the Washington County Correctional 
Facility (―WCCF‖).  Upon his arrival, Consonery informed a WCCF nurse that he had an 
infected tooth and needed to see a dentist.  Shortly thereafter, Consonery’s tooth 
―snapped,‖ causing severe pain and bleeding.  Consonery complained orally and in 
writing to the defendants.  Medical and dental professionals at WCCF examined 
Consonery and determined that he should be evaluated for extraction of the tooth by an 
outside oral surgeon.  WCCF officials informed Consonery that he would have to make 
arrangements for further treatment through a furlough.
1
  
                                              
1
 Pennsylvania law provides for furloughs, which result in a temporary release from 
custody, as follows: 
 
(a) Generally.—Notwithstanding any provision of law, if any offender has been 
sentenced to undergo imprisonment in a county jail for a term of less than five 
years, the court, at the time of sentence or at any time thereafter upon application 
made in accordance with this section, may enter an order making the offender 
eligible to leave the jail during necessary and reasonable hours for the purpose of 
working at his employment, conducting his own business or other self-employed 
occupation, including housekeeping and attending to the needs of family, seeking 
employment, attending an educational institution, securing medical treatment or 
for other lawful purposes as the court shall consider necessary and appropriate. 
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 Although Consonery made attempts to schedule an appointment with an outside 
oral surgeon through a furlough, he was unsuccessful.  Meanwhile, the defendants 
refused to provide Consonery treatment at WCCF, and, with the exception of a single 
course of antibiotics, his tooth remained untreated.  On June 5, 2009, Consonery was 
placed into the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.  On June 11, 
2009, he was transferred to the State Correctional Institute at Camp Hill, where he 
received the required dental treatment.  
 Consonery brought this action in the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
against Washington County and seven WCCF officials, alleging that the defendants acted 
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition in violation of his rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  The 
defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the 
individual WCCF officials were entitled to qualified immunity.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment with regard to Consonery’s claims for punitive damages as to 
Washington County, all of his claims as to defendant District Attorney Steven M. 
Toprani, and his retaliation claim as to all of the defendants.  The Court denied the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment in all other respects, because it concluded that 
there remain genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a jury.   
 Defendants Warden Joseph W. Pelzer, Senior Captain Edward Strawn, Captain 
Michael King, Officer Chris Cain, Officer John Stapleton, Deputy Warden John Temas, 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
42 Pa. C.S. § 9813(a). 
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Nurse Jane Esther, and Washington County now appeal all claims for which the District 
Court denied summary judgment.   
II. 
 This appeal comes to us before the District Court has entered a final judgment in 
the case, so we will begin with the issue of appellate jurisdiction.  As a general rule, we 
only have jurisdiction over ―final decisions‖ of the district courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
―[I]nterlocutory appeals – appeals before the end of district court proceedings – are the 
exception, not the rule.‖  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).  Rulings denying 
summary judgment are ―by their terms interlocutory‖ and not appealable under § 1291.  
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976); see also Ziccardi v. City of 
Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that we do not have jurisdiction to hear ―an 
appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment if the issue raised is 
whether or not the evidence in the pretrial record [is] sufficient to show a genuine issue of 
fact for trial‖ (quotation marks omitted)).2  Thus, to the extent that the defendants in the 
present case ask us to review whether the evidence in the pretrial record is sufficient to 
show genuine issues of fact for trial, we do not have jurisdiction over their appeal.   
 An exception to the general rule applies for certain denials of qualified immunity.  
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).  This exception arises under the collateral 
order doctrine, which provides that certain ―collateral orders,‖ entered before a case has 
ended, amount to ―final decisions‖ that are immediately appealable under § 1291.  Cohen 
                                              
2
  Summary judgment must be denied when a district court determines that a ―genuine 
dispute as to [a] material fact‖ precludes immediate entry of judgment as a matter of law.   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
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v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).  Such orders fall within 
the ―small class [of decisions] which finally determine claims of right separable from, 
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the 
whole case is adjudicated.‖  Id.  Qualified immunity shields officials from suit if their 
conduct ―d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.‖  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
A district court’s denial of qualified immunity may constitute a collateral order, because 
immunity ―is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial,‖ and the 
district court’s determination is ―effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.‖  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.   
 We have held that ―denial of qualified immunity falls within the collateral-order 
doctrine only to the extent the denial turns on an issue of law.‖  In re Montgomery Cnty., 
215 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Generally, the relevant issue of law is whether the right that the defendant is 
alleged to have violated was ―clearly established‖ at the time the defendant acted.  See 
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996).  Where the denial turns on the sufficiency 
of the evidence, it may not be appealed until the district court enters final judgment in the 
case.  See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. 
In denying the defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, the District Court 
correctly applied a twofold inquiry, asking whether:  (1) ―the facts alleged, taken in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional 
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right‖; and (2) ―whether the right was clearly established.‖  Consonery v. Pelzer, 2013 
WL 593982, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 2013).  With regard to the first prong, the District 
Court held that, ―the record . . . raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether each 
Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s need for treatment for a condition causing severe 
chronic pain and yet stood idly by.‖  Id.   We do not have jurisdiction to consider this 
holding, because it turns on issues of fact.  Considering the second prong, the District 
Court found that ―the law with regard to a constitutional obligation to provide care to 
inmates suffering unnecessary pain from a serious medical need has been clear since at 
least 1976, when the United States Supreme Court decided Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 104 (1976).‖  Id.  This finding constitutes the only legal issue decided by the District 
Court, and therefore it is the only issue raised in this appeal that we can consider. 
Accordingly, we will consider whether ―the legal norms allegedly violated by the 
defendant[s] were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions,‖  Mitchell, 
472 U.S. at 527–28, and dismiss the remainder of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
III. 
 To be clearly established, ―[t]he contours of the [constitutional] right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.‖  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  As we have 
explained repeatedly, the Supreme Court, in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), set 
forth the framework for analyzing claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical 
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needs.
3
  See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003); Reynolds v. 
Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 172 (3d Cir. 1997); Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates 
v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  This standard was clearly established in 
2009, when Consonery was incarcerated at WCCF.  Indeed, the defendants even note in 
their brief to this Court that Estelle sets forth the applicable standard for Consonery’s 
claims.  See Defendants’ Br. 10.  Hence, the District Court did not err in finding that  
Estelle was clearly established law when Consonery was incarcerated at WCCF, and we 
will affirm the Court’s legal conclusion.  
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in part 
and dismiss the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
                                              
3
  In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that, in order to state a cognizable claim for cruel 
and unusual punishment based on the denial of medical care, ―a prisoner must allege acts 
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs.‖  429 U.S. at 106.   
